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RULE 10B-5 AT THE INTERSECTION OF 
GREENWASH AND GREEN INVESTMENT: 
THE PROBLEM OF ECONOMIC LOSS 
CADESBY B. COOPER* 
Abstract: Despite the recent growth of socially responsible investment (“SRI”), 
there is little evidence supporting its central claim: that it can affect a company’s 
cost of capital, thus inducing good behavior. Accordingly, this Note questions 
whether there are legal ramifications for a company that misrepresents its envi-
ronmental and social practices, when such practices in fact do not affect the ex-
pected future cash flows of the company, the company’s cost of capital, and in 
turn, the price of the company’s stock. SEC Rule 10b-5 provides a private right 
of action for securities fraud, but requires that an investor sustain an economic 
loss as a result of a company’s material misrepresentation. If SRI cannot affect a 
company’s cost of capital, and ultimately its stock price, then Rule 10b-5 is una-
vailable—the economic loss element of the claim cannot be satisfied. The human 
motivations for SRI are complex, however, and financial professionals continue 
to make investment decisions based on companies’ social and environmental rep-
resentations, which the companies continue to make, perhaps, to gain reputation-
al benefit in the eyes of consumers. For these reasons, this Note argues that there 
should be a legal remedy for “green misrepresentations” that do not cause a drop 
in share price. It goes on to suggest that preventative measures be implemented 
because, regardless of the economic harm to the investor, there is a direct moral 
harm in being misled into supporting environmental practices counter to one’s 
beliefs, and an opportunity cost in foregoing investments that produce real-world 
benefits for the environment and society. 
INTRODUCTION 
Socially responsible investment (“SRI”) practices have grown tremen-
dously over the past two decades.1 The latest statistics show that assets en-
gaged in SRI represent over eleven percent of the $33 trillion of assets under 
management in the U.S. financial market.2 SRI includes the practice of invest-
                                                                                                                           
 * Senior Articles Editor, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW, 2014–
2015. 
 1 THE FORUM FOR SUSTAINABLE & RESPONSIBLE INV., REPORT ON SUSTAINABLE AND RESPON-
SIBLE INVESTING TRENDS IN THE UNITED STATES 11–12 (2012), available at http://www.ussif.org/
files/publications/12_trends_exec_summary.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/Q9KC-9LA6 (“From 
1995 to 2012, the SRI universe increased by 486[%] while the broader universe of [managed assets] 
increased by 376[%].”). 
 2 Id. at 11. 
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ing based on religious, labor, or human rights grounds.3 It also includes green 
investing, which usually refers to the practice of excluding companies from, or 
including companies into, an investment portfolio based on the impact that 
their business strategies have on the environment.4 Ultimately, green investors 
want to make a profit while addressing pressing environmental issues such as 
climate change.5 
The heightened social and environmental awareness of consumers and in-
vestors, however, has caused companies to misrepresent their practices as 
green, when in fact, they do not produce real-world benefit to the environ-
ment.6 Termed “greenwash,” these communications disclose false or mislead-
ing claims about environmental performance.7 Companies have an incentive to 
greenwash to improve returns on investments and to gain positive goodwill in 
the form of reputation because it is cheaper and easier to misrepresent the ex-
tent or existence of a green practice than it is to establish an effective one, es-
pecially when managers do not feel that they will be held accountable in the 
short run.8 Often, companies need only communicate their green practices to 
generate positive goodwill or adopt hollow green processes for inclusion 
among green investing portfolios.9 Evidence also suggests that green norms 
within an industry can pressure laggards to greenwash their practices to avoid 
the competitive disadvantage of a poor environmental reputation while saving 
the costs that their competitors spend for green results.10 
Unlike the consumer context, in which the Federal Trade Commission 
(FTC) has made some effort to curb the proliferation of greenwashed adver-
tisements,11 similar regulatory action has been nonexistent within securities 
                                                                                                                           
 3 HUNG-GAY FUNG ET AL., SOCIALLY RESPONSIBLE INVESTMENT IN A GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT 5 
(2010). 
 4 See id. 
 5 See id. at 6, 15. 
 6 See Magali A. Delmas & Vanessa Cuerel Burbano, The Drivers of Greenwashing, 54 CAL. 
MGMT. REV., no. 1, Fall 2011, at 64, 64. 
 7 See id. at 65. 
 8 See BENJAMIN J. RICHARDSON, SOCIALLY RESPONSIBLE INVESTMENT LAW: REGULATING THE 
UNSEEN POLLUTERS 11 (2008); Delmas & Burbano, supra note 6, at 73; Caroline Flammer, Corpo-
rate Social Responsibility and Shareholder Reaction: The Environmental Awareness of Investors, 56 
ACAD. MGMT. J. 758, 760 (2013) (noting that CEOs have cited “brand, trust, and reputation . . . as one 
of the main factors driving them to take action on sustainability issues”). 
 9 See Magali A. Delmas et al., Triangulating Environmental Performance: What Do Corporate 
Social Responsibility Ratings Really Capture?, 27 ACAD. MGMT. PERSP. 255, 263 (2013). 
 10 See Delmas & Burbano, supra note 6, at 72; Flammer, supra note 8, at 759. 
 11 The Federal Trade Commission Act and the Lanham Act govern consumer protection and false 
advertising claims, but do not effectively regulate greenwashing claims. See Nick Feinstein, Note, 
Learning From Past Mistakes: Future Regulation to Prevent Greenwashing, 40 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. 
REV. 229, 239–40, 241–42 (2013). Neither statute provides for citizen standing, leaving the FTC as 
the sole policing agent. See id. at 252. The FTC has demonstrated considerable inaction over such 
claims. See id. at 245 (noting that the FTC brought zero claims against alleged greenwashing compa-
nies between 2000 and 2009). The FTC’s main contribution in the area has been the publication of 
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fraud law.12 The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) neither requires 
disclosure of all environmental information that might be considered socially 
or ethically important, nor regulates the myriad ratings systems in place that 
quantify the environmental performance of companies for green investors.13 
Companies that voluntarily disclose social or ethical misinformation, however, 
can incur liability under the catchall anti-fraud provisions of SEC Rule 10b-5, 
or the “Rule.”14 
The U.S. Supreme Court has created a private right of action under the 
Rule that might be available to some victims of green misrepresentation, but 
both the Court and Congress have significantly narrowed its scope in recent 
decades.15 Moreover, the Rule requires that a plaintiff suffer an economic loss 
and limits the amount of recovery to the drop in share price attributable to the 
defendant’s representational misconduct.16 Thus, whether brought by the SEC 
or a private plaintiff, Rule 10b-5 is inherently ill suited for application in the 
SRI market, where largely intangible and non-economic values drive invest-
ment decisions and where the social and environmental costs of misrepresenta-
tions do not necessarily translate into immediate market losses.17 
Some commenters have noted the possible application of a private Rule 
10b-5 action to green misrepresentations without exploring the unique difficul-
ties presented by its focus on economic loss.18 Not all green misrepresentations 
create equal harms, and although some manifest an economic harm, others do 
not.19 Central to SRI and green investing is the use of investor screens that sort 
                                                                                                                           
“Green Guides” that advance a standard, albeit in the form of a guideline lacking the force of law. Id. 
at 242–43. Furthermore, the statutes “lack the specificity and detail to adequately police environmen-
tal claims.” Id. at 252–53. 
 12 See Elizabeth Ann Glass Geltman, Disclosure of Contingent Environmental Liabilities by Pub-
lic Companies Under the Federal Securities Laws, 16 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 129, 169–70 (1992); 
Benjamin J. Richardson & Wes Cragg, Being Virtuous and Prosperous: SRI’s Conflicting Goals, 92 J. 
BUS. ETHICS (SUPPLEMENT 1) 21, 30 (2010). 
 13 Geltman, supra note 12, at 169–70 (“[T]he SEC retracted its 1973 rules requiring disclosure of 
all environmental information that might be considered socially or ethically important regardless of its 
traditional materiality, because the resulting excessive level of disclosure obscured truly ‘material’ 
information.”). 
 14 See id. at 169. 
 15 See infra note 107 and accompanying text. 
 16 See, e.g., Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton, Co., 131 S. Ct. 2179, 2186 (2011). 
 17 See FUNG ET AL, supra note 3, at 46; Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Reassessing Damages in 
Securities Fraud Class Actions, 66 MD. L. REV. 348, 369–70 (2007). 
 18 See Rachel Cherington, Securities Laws and Corporate Social Responsibility: Toward an Ex-
panded Use of Rule 10b-5, 25 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 1439, 1452–53 (2004) (focusing on the issue 
of materiality); Miriam A. Cherry & Judd F. Sneirson, Chevron, Greenwashing, and the Myth of 
“Green Oil Companies,” 3 WASH. & LEE J. ENERGY, CLIMATE & ENV’T 133, 146–48 (2012) (focus-
ing on the issue of materiality). 
 19 See Richardson & Cragg, supra note 12, at 32. For example, human rights abuses and envi-
ronmental abuses might be legal in some countries, particularly those with emerging economies. Id. If 
these practices were originally misrepresented to investors then they would not incur legal costs to the 
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investment targets according to their environmental track records.20 Proponents 
of SRI contend that foregoing investment in, or divesting from, a company 
causes a drop in its market value.21 If this were true, then green investors 
would always be able to bring a Rule 10b-5 action—assuming its other ele-
ments were met—because the divestment by green investors following a cor-
rected misrepresentation would create a market loss even if the misrepresenta-
tion itself did not involve information that changed the company’s expected 
future cash flows.22 Finance theory, however, casts this assumption in a dubi-
ous light,23 and in turn, calls into doubt the availability of private Rule 10b-5 
remedies in many circumstances.24 Regardless of economic loss, however, 
green investors who fall prey to misrepresentations of a purely social or green 
character suffer losses of another kind.25 First, they suffer from having been 
duped into supporting practices antithetical to their moral code.26 Second, they 
suffer an opportunity cost on their investment; although they might get their 
money back after learning of a green misrepresentation—by selling their 
stock—they have lost opportunities during the investment period to invest in 
companies that actually utilize true green practices.27  
This Note analyzes the extent to which the Rule’s private right of action is 
available to victims of greenwash.28 Part I summarizes the concept of SRI and 
the investment methodology of green investors.29 Part II introduces the Securi-
ties and Exchange Act and Supreme Court precedent on the Rule.30 Part III 
analyzes the elements of the Rule to demonstrate the extent to which it is 
available to victims of green misrepresentation and concludes that the claim 
will generally be unavailable when the misrepresentation does not involve in-
formation bearing on the future expected cash flows of the company.31 Part IV 
suggests an administrative alternative to the Rule that aims to prevent green 
                                                                                                                           
company when they came to light. See id. If no other costs were incurred, then the market value of the 
company’s stock would not be affected because it simply reflects the expected future cash flows of the 
business. See RICHARDSON, supra note 8, at 166–67. 
 20 See FUNG ET AL., supra note 3, at 8 (noting that “social screening, which accounts for about 
72[%] of the money in SRI mutual funds, is the most prevalent form of SRI . . .”). 
 21 RICHARDSON, supra note 8, at 165. 
 22 See id. at 165–67. 
 23 See id. at 165 (explaining that finance theory does not support the proposition that SRI can 
induce a company to behave in a certain way because it cannot affect its cost of capital or its stock 
price). 
 24 See id.; supra note 19 and accompanying text. 
 25 See FUNG ET AL., supra note 3, at 3; RICHARDSON, supra note 8, at 12–13, 20–21. 
 26 See FUNG ET AL., supra note 3, at 3; RICHARDSON, supra note 8, at 12–13, 20–21. 
 27 See Delmas & Burbano, supra note 6, at 73; Delmas et al., supra note 9, at 263. 
 28 See infra notes 166–294 and accompanying text. 
 29 See infra notes 33–89 and accompanying text. 
 30 See infra notes 90–164 and accompanying text. 
 31 See infra notes 166–261 and accompanying text. 
2015] Rule 10b-5 at the Intersection of Greenwash and Green Investment 409 
misrepresentations by considering the intangible interests at stake and remov-
ing the incentives for companies to greenwash.32 
I. SOCIALLY RESPONSIBLE INVESTMENT 
SRI encompasses a broad array of “investments and investment strategies 
that . . . attempt to create positive social change, minimize environmental dam-
age, and incorporate religious or ethical beliefs.”33 SRI is based on the premise 
that private investment imposes costs on the public that should be internalized 
by the investor.34 Ultimately, socially responsible investors (“SRI investors”) 
hope to prosper financially while building a better world.35 This investment 
strategy has become one of the fastest growing segments of the financial mar-
ket as more of today’s investors consider how their investment decisions im-
pact their community and the environment they share with others within the 
modern global system.36 
A. The Forms of SRI 
Once filtered by conventional financial metrics, SRI investors typically 
construct their portfolios by assessing companies according to additional envi-
ronmental and social criteria.37 Investors might use one or more of several dis-
tinct but related selection strategies.38 Among the most common forms are 
shareholder engagement and activism and the use of investment screens39 
based on social or environmental performance.40 The first strategy involves 
                                                                                                                           
 32 See infra notes 262–294 and accompanying text. 
 33 FUNG ET AL., supra note 3, at 1; RICHARDSON, supra note 8, at 84. 
 34 See Richardson & Cragg, supra note 12, at 22. 
 35 See FUNG ET AL., supra note 3, at 6. 
 36 Id. at 1–2; see THE FORUM FOR SUSTAINABLE & RESPONSIBLE INV., supra note 1, at 11–12 
(providing statistics of SRI growth in relation to overall market growth of professionally managed 
assets). SRI’s roots reach back to the nineteenth century when Christian investors began screening 
their investments for activities they considered sinful. Michael S. Knoll, Ethical Screening in Modern 
Financial Markets: The Conflicting Claims Underlying Socially Responsible Investment, 57 BUS. 
LAW. 681, 684 (2002). The year 1928 marked the first public offering of a screened investment 
fund—the Pioneer Fund in Boston—by an ecclesiastical group. Id. Similarly, students during the 
Vietnam era pressured universities to divest their portfolios of defense industry stocks. Id. The 1970s 
saw the creation of two major mutual funds: Pax World Fund and Third Century Fund. Id. at 685. 
These funds respectively screened out arms producers and compiled a portfolio of companies that 
supported their communities and the environment. Id. The most prominent example of SRI employ-
ment occurred in the 1980s with the widespread screening and divestment by U.S. investors of South 
African companies that supported Apartheid. Id. 
 37 FUNG ET AL., supra note 3, at 27; RICHARDSON, supra note 8, at 90. 
 38 FUNG ET AL., supra note 3, at 27. 
 39 See infra notes 45–49 and accompanying text (explaining that investment screens are applied to 
SRI portfolios by adding or removing companies based on positive and negative criteria). 
 40 See FUNG ET AL., supra note 3, at 27–28; RICHARDSON, supra note 8, at 95–98; see also Robert 
A.G. Monks, Introduction to PETER CAMEJO, THE SRI ADVANTAGE: WHY SOCIALLY RESPONSIBLE 
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shareholders who engage their company’s managers through active dialogue to 
promote beneficial environmental and social practices.41 Shareholder activists, 
on the other hand, seek the same results as engagers, but employ more direct 
tactics.42 They might attempt to circumvent complacent managers by submit-
ting resolutions and voting at annual meetings.43 Even if the shareholder reso-
lutions are not adopted, they can result in negotiated settlements with the com-
pany that ultimately improve its social accountability.44 
SRI portfolios can be screened according to negative and positive crite-
ria.45 Negative screening excludes particular investment opportunities in target 
acquisitions that perform poorly according to social and environmental stand-
ards.46 A negative screen, for example, might exclude oil, tobacco, or weapons 
manufacturers from a SRI portfolio.47 Positive screening, on the other hand, 
actively seeks companies that perform highly according to social or environ-
mental standards.48 A positive screen can be more difficult to apply than a neg-
ative screen because some social criteria are not quantifiable, which can make 
the ultimate investment decision depend heavily on the investor’s values and 
judgment when considering multiple investment opportunities.49 
B. Green Investment Screen Metrics 
Fund managers and individual investors use green screens—whether posi-
tive or negative—to choose investments based on environmental criteria.50 
These criteria attempt to quantify or otherwise reflect the environmental prac-
tices of companies and can be divided into several categories, including eco-
efficiency, environmental impact, and environmental management.51 Eco-
efficiency refers to the ratio of a good or service’s value, to the amount of natu-
ral resources, waste, and pollution that are used or created during its produc-
                                                                                                                           
INVESTING HAS OUTPERFORMED FINANCIALLY, at xvi–xviii (2002) (arguing that passive screening 
practices may be ineffective and that active shareholder involvement is a “critical element for an ef-
fective SRI”). 
 41 FUNG ET AL., supra note 3, at 30; RICHARDSON, supra note 8, at 95. 
 42 FUNG ET AL., supra note 3, at 30; RICHARDSON, supra note 8, at 96. 
 43 FUNG ET AL., supra note 3, at 30; RICHARDSON, supra note 8, at 96. 
 44 FUNG ET AL., supra note 3, at 30–31. Resolutions need not be adopted to be effective. Id. 
(providing example that “shareholders withdrew a climate proposal at Ford Motor Company after the 
company presented its plans to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by thirty percent in new vehicles by 
the year 2020”); see also RICHARDSON, supra note 8, at 96 (explaining why resolutions need not be 
adopted to be effective). 
 45 FUNG ET AL., supra note 3, at 28; RICHARDSON, supra note 8, at 90. 
 46 FUNG ET AL., supra note 3, at 28; RICHARDSON, supra note 8, at 90. 
 47 FUNG ET AL., supra note 3, at 28; RICHARDSON, supra note 8, at 90. 
 48 FUNG ET AL., supra note 3, at 28; RICHARDSON, supra note 8, at 90. 
 49 FUNG ET AL., supra note 3, at 28. 
 50 See id. at 31–32; RICHARDSON, supra note 8, at 94. 
 51 FUNG ET AL., supra note 3, at 32–33. 
2015] Rule 10b-5 at the Intersection of Greenwash and Green Investment 411 
tion.52 It may include the measure of minimum energy use, minimum waste 
disposal in landfills, or minimum greenhouse gas emissions.53 Environmental 
impacts measure the real-world effects of a company’s operations.54 Such im-
pacts include measurements of water, soil, air, and groundwater pollution, loss 
of biodiversity, and impacts on natural resources such as forests and fisheries.55 
Criteria within the environmental management category include a company’s 
professed and practiced commitments to the environment and its managerial 
practices.56 These include policy statements from corporate officers about their 
stand on environmental issues and the institution of environmentally friendly 
systems throughout the entire lifecycle of the company’s products or ser-
vices.57 
With the rise in SRI’s popularity, a number of specialized organizations 
have created performance indices that rate companies according to environ-
mental criteria.58 These indices can be useful to SRI investors because they 
condense a company’s environmental performance into comparable numbers.59 
Neither rating companies nor fund managers, however, have accepted any one 
methodology to create these metrics, and the SEC has not offered any guidance 
in this area.60 Thus, although performance metrics and indices might help in-
vestors decide which companies are actually producing green outcomes, the 
disparity between current ratings methodologies, the lack of transparency and 
accountability in portfolio selection, and the lack of regulatory guidance 
dampen their effectiveness.61 
                                                                                                                           
 52 Id. at 33. 
 53 Id. 
 54 Id. 
 55 Id. 
 56 Id. at 33–34. 
 57 Id. at 34. 
 58 Delmas et al., supra note 9, at 255–58; see also RICHARDSON, supra note 8, at 90 (noting that 
some market index companies, such as KLD Research and Analytics, claim to construct their indices 
according to environmental and social criteria and only then evaluate financial performance “retro-
spectively,” whereas others construct their indices considering environmental and financial perfor-
mance contemporaneously). Other examples of market indices include the Domini Social Equity 
Fund, see Domini Social Equity Fund, DOMINI SOC. INVS, https://www.domini.com/domini-funds/
domini-social-equity-fund (last visited Feb. 11, 2015) archived at https://perma.cc/2UJB-T368, and 
the Calvert Social Index, see The Calvert Social Index, CALVERT INVS., http://www.calvert.com/sri-
index.html (last visited Feb. 11, 2015), available at http://perma.cc/E4RP-KEZ8. 
 59 See FUNG ET AL., supra note 3, at 36; RICHARDSON, supra note 8, at 94 (noting that indices can 
“form a template” for individual and fund investors). 
 60 See FUNG ET AL., supra note 3, at 40; RICHARDSON, supra note 8, at 147; Delmas et al., supra 
note 9, at 256. The SEC explicitly notes on its website that it does not regulate market indices. Market 
Indices, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, http://www.sec.gov/answers/indices.htm (last visited Feb. 9, 
2015), archived at http://perma.cc/3JYY-Z2WR. 
 61 See FUNG ET AL., supra note 3, at 39–40; RICHARDSON, supra note 8, at 147; Delmas et al., 
supra note 9, at 256. 
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Although green investors can use or formulate environmental metrics, 
they must ultimately base them on the voluntary or required disclosures of 
companies.62 Environmentally responsible investors thus face at least three 
challenges: (1) making a decision when there is not enough data on point; (2) 
ascribing value based on available data to environmental risks that are inher-
ently difficult to measure and value; and (3) unknowingly relying on green-
washed data.63 
C. Incentives to Invest in SRI 
The green screen metrics reflect green investors’ dual aims of supporting 
environmentally positive practices within business operations and also reaping 
a return.64 Green investors, like other SRI investors, base their investment de-
cisions partly on their ethical beliefs or values.65 They can be divided into at 
least two general groups.66 First, there are those who feel that the psychic com-
fort of behaving ethically compensates for the possible greater risk and less 
return that might be associated with their SRI portfolio.67 Second, there are 
those who do not believe that there must be a direct trade-off between high 
financial returns and social responsibility.68 These investors believe that the 
long-term risk-adjusted returns are greater for SRI portfolios than for conven-
tional portfolios because social responsibility translates into more sustainable 
business practices, which in turn, yield higher returns in the long run and gen-
erally signal that a company is well managed.69 
These classifications show that SRI screening is still investment because 
it involves a present payment for a future return.70 But, to some extent, both 
groups of SRI investors want to do good to feel good, in addition to getting a 
return on their investment.71 The second group of investors, however—who 
equate sustainability with profitability—share incentives that coincide with 
traditional investors.72 Yet, to be considered true SRI adherents, even these 
                                                                                                                           
 62 See Delmas et al., supra note 9, at 263. 
 63 See FUNG ET AL., supra note 3, at 16. 
 64 Id. at 44. 
 65 RICHARDSON, supra note 8, at 12–13; see FUNG ET AL., supra note 3, at 3. 
 66 FUNG ET AL., supra note 3, at 3 (dividing SRI investors into three categories based on their 
investment philosophies); RICHARDSON, supra note 8, at 12–13 (dividing SRI investors as “business 
case” or “ethical case” according to their investment philosophies). 
 67 See FUNG ET AL., supra note 3, at 3; RICHARDSON, supra note 8, at 12–13, 20–21. 
 68 FUNG ET AL., supra note 3, at 3; RICHARDSON, supra note 8, at 12–13. 
 69 FUNG ET AL., supra note 3, at 3; see RICHARDSON, supra note 8, at 13. 
 70 See Knoll, supra note 36, at 689. 
 71 See FUNG ET AL., supra note 3, at 3, 46. 
 72 See id. at 3. 
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sustainable investors must also rely on non-financial criteria to some extent 
and must consider these factors independently from their financial impact.73 
The reason that both groups believe that social screening can be consist-
ently profitable is because it supposedly filters out short-sighted companies 
that try to cut costs in the short-term, which creates greater long-term risk.74 
For example, short-term upfront costs such as regulatory compliance might not 
produce immediate value to a company, but such costs can save the company 
money down the road.75 Similarly, environmental site studies and site prepara-
tion, which might go beyond regulatory compliance requirements, can be ex-
pensive in the short-term but could yield the benefit of uncovering and mitigat-
ing unique site risks that would otherwise incur tort or statutory liability later 
on.76 
Yet even when SRI is not based on environmental risks that directly im-
pact a company’s bottom line, SRI investors believe that social screening can 
create good in the world because it influences the behavior of companies.77 
This assumes that a screened investment or divestment will affect a company’s 
stock price, which will, in turn, affect its cost of capital.78 As a low cost of cap-
ital is beneficial to a company, SRI investors believe that they wield the power 
to reward and punish.79 Although this might be true in some circumstances, 
both conventional finance theory and real world case studies indicate that such 
power would be an exception, rather than the rule.80 
D. The Incentives for Company Compliance with SRI Goals 
SRI practices can provide companies with a competitive advantage 
through risk avoidance, the potential for sustainable profit, and reputational 
gain.81 Companies that incorporate environmental factors in their strategic ob-
jectives might be able to differentiate themselves from their industry peers.82 
This reputational benefit can improve their relationship with governmental 
agencies and the public.83 Indeed, between fifty and seventy percent of the 
                                                                                                                           
 73 Knoll, supra note 36, at 691. For a study on the factors that drive SRI decisions, see Geoffrey 
Williams, Some Determinants of the Socially Responsible Investment Decision: A Cross-Country 
Study, 8 J. BEHAV. FIN. 43, 54 (2007) (suggesting that consumers’ characteristics and their general 
attitude towards the social policies of a company impact their investment decision, whereas financial 
and demographic factors do not). 
 74 See FUNG ET AL., supra note 3, at 74. 
 75 See id. 
 76 See id. 
 77 RICHARDSON, supra note 8, at 165–66. 
 78 Id.; see infra note 206 and accompanying text (defining cost of capital). 
 79 RICHARDSON, supra note 8, at 165. 
 80 Id. at 166, 170; see Knoll, supra note 36, at 710. 
 81 See FUNG ET AL., supra note 3, at 76; Richardson & Cragg, supra note 12, at 28. 
 82 See FUNG ET AL., supra note 3, at 76. 
 83 Id. at 75. 
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business value of many large public companies is attributable to their brand 
name and goodwill.84 Reputational risk, therefore, heavily influences compa-
nies’ efforts to make a commitment to green practice.85 
This alleged commitment to green practices, however, need not translate 
into actual positive outcomes for the environment to garner investor approval 
of it, and thus reputational benefit.86 To keep up with industry leaders, some 
organizations might misrepresent their practices for fear of falling behind ri-
vals who have already implemented actual green practices.87 In sum, both en-
vironmentally responsible investors and greenwashing companies seek intan-
gibles from each other in the form of the psychic comfort from doing good and 
reputational benefits, respectively.88 The intangible nature of these incentives 
are difficult to value in terms of financial harm and gain, which is a precondi-
tion to any remedial measure that seeks to optimally compensate investors 
while deterring misconduct.89 
II. REGULATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL MISREPRESENTATION 
A. The Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5 
Congress passed the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 (the “Exchange 
Act” or the “Act”) to protect investors against fraud and manipulation of stock 
prices.90 The legislative underpinning of the Act was to inject honesty into the 
market through continuing disclosure requirements.91 Section 10(b) of the Act 
promotes the integrity of these disclosures by prohibiting “(1) the ‘use or em-
ploy[ment] . . . of any . . . deceptive device,’ (2) ‘in connection with the pur-
chase or sale of any security,’ and (3) ‘in contravention of Securities and Ex-
change Commission rules and regulations.’”92 
In 1942, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) promulgated 
Rule 10b-5 (the “Rule”) under the authority granted to it by Congress through 
Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act.93 The Rule provides: 
                                                                                                                           
 84 Richardson & Cragg, supra note 12, at 28. 
 85 Id. at 28–29. 
 86 See Delmas & Burbano, supra note 6, at 72. 
 87 Id. 
 88 See FUNG ET AL., supra note 3, at 46; Richardson & Cragg, supra note 12, at 28–29. 
 89 See Dane A. Holbrook, Measuring and Limiting Recovery Under Rule 10b-5: Optimizing Loss 
Causation and Damages in Securities Fraud Litigation, 39 TEX. J. BUS. L. 215, 237–39 (2003); infra 
notes 168–261 and accompanying text. 
 90 Geltman, supra note 12, at 129–30; see Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291, 
48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended in 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78pp (2012)). 
 91 Geltman, supra note 12, at 129; see Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 195 (1976). 
 92 Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 340 (2005) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b)). 
 93 Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 729 (1975). 
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It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use 
of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the 
mails or of any facility of any national securities exchange, 
 (a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, 
 (b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to 
state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements 
made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were 
made, not misleading, or 
 (c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which 
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in 
connection with the purchase or sale of any security.94 
Section 10(b) of the Act does not expressly provide a civil remedy for its 
violation and the legislative history does not suggest that Congress considered 
the creation of a private action at the time of its passage.95 There is also no in-
dication that the SEC considered the question of a private action when it 
adopted the Rule.96 Instead, courts have found an implied private right of ac-
tion under the Act and the Rule based on common law tort actions for deceit 
and misrepresentation, and have subsequently shaped the right of action, over 
the decades, into what it is today.97 
Although recognizing that the private action under the Rule is an “indis-
pensable tool” with which to fight securities fraud, Congress eventually passed 
the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (“PSLRA”) to stop signif-
icant abuses of the Rule as a class-action device in securities litigation.98 The 
PSLRA modifies the private Rule 10b-5 action with several substantive and 
procedural requirements and limits how it can be brought in federal court, in 
the class action context.99 Further, it caps recoverable damages and attorney’s 
fees, provides a “safe harbor” defense for forward-looking statements, and im-
poses heightened pleading requirements for certain elements of the Rule.100 
                                                                                                                           
 94 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2012). 
 95 Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 729. 
 96 Id. at 730. 
 97 See id. at 730–31; Burch, supra note 17, at 363. 
 98 H.R. REP. 104-369 (1995) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730; see Merrill 
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71, 81 (2006) (“According to the [House Con-
ference] Report, nuisance filings, targeting of deep-pocket defendants, vexatious discovery requests, 
and ‘manipulation by class action lawyers of the clients whom they purportedly represent’ had be-
come rampant in recent years.”). 
 99 Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified 
in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.); Amanda M. Rose, Reforming Securities Litigation Reform: Re-
structuring the Relationship Between Public and Private Enforcement of Rule 10b-5, 108 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1301, 1319 (2008). 
 100 15 U.S.C. §§ 78u-4, 78u-5 (2012); see Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc., 547 U.S. at 
81 (noting that the PSLRA also imposes restrictions on the selection of, and compensation awarded to, 
416 Environmental Affairs [Vol. 42:405 
Accordingly, to bring suit, a citizen plaintiff must allege: (1) a material 
misrepresentation or omission; (2) scienter (i.e., a wrongful state of mind); (3) 
a connection with a purchase or sale of a security; (4) reliance, often referred 
to in cases involving public securities markets—fraud-on-the-market cases—as 
transaction causation; (5) economic loss;101 and (6) loss causation (i.e., a caus-
al connection between the material misrepresentation and the loss).102 
Justice Rehnquist once described the private right of action under the 
Rule as a “judicial oak that has grown from little more than a legislative 
acorn.”103 It has also been characterized as an adaptive organism that reflects 
the economic ideology of the time.104 The Rule’s imprecise language has per-
mitted judges to apply it through the decades even as market composition and 
investor behavior have changed.105 For example, courts permitted the liberal 
use of the Rule during the middle of the twentieth century when the general 
concern in securities regulation was “essentially consumer protection to be 
accomplished through full disclosure . . . .”106 In recent decades, however, 
judges have curtailed the private use of the Rule as the financial market has 
shifted in composition to large institutional investors and fund managers who 
have been increasingly threatened by an abuse in class action and derivative 
litigation.107 
                                                                                                                           
lead plaintiffs in class actions, mandates imposition of sanctions for frivolous litigation, and authoriz-
es a stay of discovery pending resolution of a motion to dismiss). In response to the PSLRA’s re-
strictions, private plaintiffs began bringing class-action securities suits in state courts under various state 
law fraud theories that paralleled the Rule. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc., 547 U.S. at 82. 
Congress countered by passing the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998 (“SLUSA”) to 
keep certain private securities class action lawsuits alleging fraud in federal court and, thus, subject to the 
PSLRA. Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112 Stat. 3227 
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. 78bb(f)(1) (2012)); see Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc., 
547 U.S. at 82–83. 
 101 See infra notes 150–156 and accompanying text (addressing economic loss as being inter-
twined with loss causation). 
 102 Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 341–42 (2005). 
 103 Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737 (1975). 
 104 Donald C. Langevoort, Rule 10b-5 as an Adaptive Organism, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. S7, S7 
(1993). 
 105 Id. at S7, S11–S13. 
 106 Id. at S11. 
 107 Id. at S12–13; see, e.g., Janus Capital Grp., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296, 
2302 (2011) (narrowly interpreting the element of “making” a misrepresentation); Tellabs, Inc. v. 
Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007) (interpreting “strong inference” of scienter 
within the meaning of the PSLRA); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71, 
86 (2006) (holding the SLUSA preempts state law class action lawsuits brought by purchasers and 
sellers of securities); Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 
164, 191 (1994) (holding that a private plaintiff may not maintain an aiding and abetting suit under the 
Rule). 
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In relation to green investing, the Rule complements the SEC’s mandatory 
contingent environmental disclosure requirements, found in Regulation S-K.108 
The Rule serves as a broad catchall anti-fraud provision that fills the gaps be-
tween the periodic and continuous mandatory disclosure requirements of the 
Exchange Act by creating liability for certain material misrepresentations or 
omissions.109 
1. Material Misrepresentation or Omission of Fact 
A misrepresentation or omission of fact must be material in nature.110 The 
U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly eschewed a bright-line materiality test, 
recognizing that “any approach that designates a single fact or occurrence as 
always determinative of an inherently fact-specific finding . . . must necessari-
ly be [over or under inclusive].”111 It has instead chosen a delicate case-by-
case assessment: the materiality requirement is satisfied when “there is a sub-
stantial likelihood that the disclosure of the omitted fact would have been 
viewed by the reasonable investor as having significantly altered the ‘total 
mix’ of information made available.”112 The Court chose this threshold—and 
not a lower one—because it does not want managers to bombard investors 
with trivial information in an attempt to obfuscate informed decision-
making.113 
In Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, the plaintiff alleged that a de-
fendant’s failure to disclose medical reports that showed a possible causal link 
between one of its cold medications and adverse health effects in those who 
took the medication was a material omission.114 The Court declined to find the 
omission immaterial simply because the scientific reports at issue did not sup-
port causation with statistically significant data.115 It held that the failure to 
reveal the reports was a material omission because they demonstrated a plausi-
ble causal link between the medication and the malady in light of all of the 
                                                                                                                           
 108 Perry E. Wallace, Disclosure of Environmental Liabilities Under the Securities Laws: The 
Potential of Securities-Market-Based Incentives for Pollution Control, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 
1093, 1105, 1115 (1993) (noting that the SEC has promulgated a series of environmental provisions, 
contained in Regulation S-K, which require disclosure of actual or potential environmental liabilities and 
obligations); see Item 303, 17 C.F.R. § 229.303 (2014). 
 109 Wallace, supra note 108, at 1115. 
 110 Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, 131 S. Ct. 1309, 1318 (2011). 
 111 Id. at 1318–19. 
 112 Id. at 1318 (quoting TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1975)). 
 113Id. 
 114 Id. at 1314. 
 115 Id. at 1319. 
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facts, and thus the potential for liability, which would have altered the total 
mix of information relevant to a reasonable investor.116 
In In re Ford Motor Co. Securities Litigation, the plaintiff alleged that the 
defendant’s professed commitment to quality, safety, and corporate citizenship 
was a material misrepresentation in light of its sale of defective products.117 
For example, the company claimed that it sold products of superior quality and 
that it wanted to be the leader in corporate social responsibility.118 The U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit found these statements to be “mere cor-
porate puffery or hyperbole that a reasonable investor would not view as sig-
nificantly changing” the total mix of information available.119 Such “rosy af-
firmations” from corporate managers, it reasoned, are “numbingly familiar to 
the marketplace—loosely optimistic statements that are so vague, so lacking in 
specificity, or so clearly constituting the opinions of the speaker, that no rea-
sonable investor” would consider them material, even if they were mislead-
ing.120 
2. Connection with a Purchase or Sale of a Security 
The Supreme Court has deemed the language of the Exchange Act to 
evince a Congressional scheme that limits the plaintiff class in a Rule 10b-5 
action to “actual purchasers and sellers.”121 These include those who have en-
tered a contract to purchase or sell a security or otherwise obtained contractual 
rights or duties, such as in a put, call, or option.122 Recognizing that Congres-
sional intent is not easily ascertained in the Act, and observing that judicial 
craftsmanship largely fashioned the Rule from its inception, the Court based its 
decision to limit the plaintiff class primarily on the prudential concern that a 
broader class would invite abuse through vexatious litigation.123 
At least three classes of plaintiffs therefore cannot bring claims under the 
Rule because they lack the necessary contractual relationship: (1) potential 
purchasers of shares who allege that a material misrepresentation or omission 
caused them to forego a purchase; (2) shareholders who allege that they decid-
                                                                                                                           
 116 Id. at 1322 (finding that other facts in the reports, such as documented cases of illness by med-
ical professionals and a medical presentation that reported documented illness following the admin-
istration of the drug, demonstrated a plausible causal link in the absence of statistically significant 
data). 
 117 381 F.3d 563, 570 (6th Cir. 2004). 
 118 Id. 
 119 Id. 
 120 Id. at 570–71. 
 121 Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 731, 733 (1975). 
 122 Id. at 750–51; see Wharf (Holdings) Ltd. v. United Int’l Holdings, Inc., 532 U.S. 588, 589–90, 
594–95 (2001) (holding that oral purchases or sales do not fall outside of the Act because they are 
contracts to which the Act itself deems applicable). 
 123 Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 737. 
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ed not to sell their shares because of an “unduly rosy representation or a failure 
to disclose unfavorable material;” and (3) “shareholders, creditors, and perhaps 
others related to [the issuing corporation] who suffered loss in the value of 
their investment due to corporate or insider activities in connection with the 
purchase or sale of securities which violate Rule 10b-5.”124 
3. Scienter 
The Supreme Court has interpreted the language of the Exchange Act to 
reflect a Congressional intent to only proscribe liability for intentional ac-
tions.125 Although the Court has thus foreclosed liability based on negligence, 
it has not expressly decided whether some level of recklessness can meet the 
scienter standard.126 As of 2007, each federal Court of Appeals that has consid-
ered the issue has held that allegations of recklessness are sufficient to satisfy 
the scienter requirement.127 
The PSLRA imposes a heightened pleading requirement for allegations of 
scienter in private securities fraud litigation.128 It requires that a plaintiff “state 
with particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant act-
ed with the required state of mind.”129 
The Court has interpreted the PSLRA’s “strong inference” standard to be 
an inherently “comparative inquiry.”130 The inference of scienter must be per-
suasive in light of other explanations.131 A complaint will survive only if “a 
reasonable person would deem the inference of scienter cogent and at least as 
compelling as any opposing inference one could draw from the facts al-
leged.”132 The Court makes this determination by looking to the allegations as 
                                                                                                                           
 124 Id. at 737–38. The second and third groups, however, can often circumvent the “actual purchaser 
or seller” limitation by bringing a derivative action on behalf of the company itself if it is a purchaser or 
seller of the securities. Id. 
 125 Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 197, 214 (1976) (inferring intent from the words 
found in Section 10(b): manipulative; device; and contrivance). 
 126 Id. at 214 n.12. The legal definition of scienter is: 
1. A degree of knowledge that makes a person legally responsible for the consequences 
of his or her act or omission; the fact of an act’s having been done knowingly, esp. as a 
ground for civil damages or criminal punishment. 2. A mental state consisting in an in-
tent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud. In this sense, the term is used most often in the 
context of securities fraud. 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1824 (10th ed. 2014). 
 127 Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308 n.3 (2007) (noting, however, that 
the circuits differ on the degree of recklessness required). 
 128 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(1) (2012); Tellabs Inc., 551 U.S. at 321. 
 129 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(1), (2). 
 130 Tellabs Inc., 551 U.S. at 323. 
 131 Id. at 324 (“The inference that the defendant acted with scienter need not be irrefutable, i.e., of 
the ‘smoking-gun’ genre, or even the most plausible of competing inferences.”). 
 132 Id. 
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a whole and treating “the absence of a motive allegation, though relevant, [as] 
not dispositive.”133 
The PSLRA additionally created a safe harbor for forward-looking state-
ments made by corporate officers, directors, and employees while working on 
the issuer’s behalf.134 It applies to, among other things, future management 
plans and objectives.135 The provision generally relieves a corporation of lia-
bility for such a statement if at least one of several conditions is met, including 
when the statement is both “forward-looking” and qualified with “meaningful 
cautionary statements identifying important factors that could cause actual re-
sults to differ materially from those [stated].”136 
In Matrixx Initiatives, Inc., the defendant argued that the plaintiff failed to 
allege facts sufficient for the Court to find that it had acted with scienter.137 
The inference that it had acted recklessly or knowingly, the defendant argued, 
was equally or less compelling than the inference that it had simply deemed 
the implicating reports to be too few in number to indicate anything meaning-
ful to its shareholders.138 The Court was not persuaded, finding that the com-
plaint stated that the defendant was sufficiently concerned about the connec-
tion between its medication and its customers’ illness that it had hired a con-
sultant to review the medication, asked an expert scientist to participate in an-
imal studies, and convened a panel of physicians and scientists.139 The Court 
noted that the defendant issued a press release suggesting the studies had con-
firmed that its product did not cause illness when, in fact, it had not conducted 
any relevant studies, and the scientific evidence at that time was inconclusive, 
a factor which it deemed to be “most significant.”140 The Court found these 
allegations as a whole gave rise to a cogent and compelling inference that the 
defendant elected to not disclose the reports of adverse events, and did so not 
because it “believed they were meaningless but because it understood their 
likely effect on the market.”141 
                                                                                                                           
 133 Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, 131 S. Ct. 1309, 1324 (2011). 
 134 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(a) (2012); see also Ann Morales Olazábal, Safe Harbor for Forward-
Looking Statements Under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995: What’s Safe and 
What’s Not?, 105 DICK. L. REV. 1, 4, 7 (2000) (explaining the applicability of the safe harbor provi-
sion and noting that underwriters and outside reviewers, such as accounting firms, are also protected 
by the provision). 
 135 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(i)(1); Olazábal, supra note 134, at 4. 
 136 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(c)(1); Olazábal, supra note 134, at 6. 
 137 131 S. Ct. at 1323. 
 138 Id. at 1324. 
 139 Id. 
 140 Id. 
 141 Id. at 1324–25. 
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4. Reliance 
Reliance provides the requisite causal connection between a defendant’s 
misrepresentation and a plaintiff’s purchase.142 Traditionally, a plaintiff proves 
reliance by showing awareness of a specific misrepresentation and that he or 
she engaged in the relevant transaction—e.g., purchasing common stock—as a 
result.143 
Modern securities fraud, however, is much more complex than early fraud 
cases because it involves a vast impersonal market in which millions of shares 
are exchanged each day.144 Whereas the reliance inquiry in a face-to-face 
transaction on a closed-market focuses on the subjective pricing of the relevant 
information by the potential buyer, “the presence of an [open] market . . . 
transmits information to the investor in the processed form of a market 
price.”145 This processed price theoretically “acts as the agent of the investor, 
informing him that given all the information available to it, the value of the 
stock is worth the market price.”146 Accordingly, a purchaser of stock on an 
open market relies on any material misrepresentation that a seller has made.147 
The Supreme Court has thus created a rebuttable presumption of reliance 
in cases of securities fraud perpetrated on the open-market in order to unen-
cumber potential plaintiffs of the “unrealistic evidentiary burden” of having to 
show a “speculative state of facts,” such as how he or she would have acted if 
the omitted material information had been disclosed or if the misrepresentation 
had not been made.148 To invoke the presumption, a plaintiff must demonstrate 
that: (1) the alleged misrepresentation was made to the public; (2) “the stock 
traded in an efficient market;” and (3) “the relevant transaction took place be-
tween the time the misrepresentation was made and the time the truth was re-
vealed.”149 
                                                                                                                           
 142 Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton, Co., 131 S. Ct. 2179, 2184–85 (2011). 
 143 Id. at 2185. 
 144 Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 243–44 (1988). 
 145 In re LTV Sec. Litig., 88 F.R.D. 134, 143 (D. Tex. 1980); see also Basic Inc., 485 U.S. at 244 
(quoting In re LTV Sec. Lit., 88 F.R.D. at 143). 
 146 In re LTV Sec. Litig., 88 F.R.D. at 143; see also Basic Inc., 485 U.S. at 244 (quoting In re LTV 
Sec. Lit., 88 F.R.D. at 143). 
 147 Basic Inc., 485 U.S. at 244. 
 148 Id. at 245. The Court gives examples of showings that would rebut this presumption, such as a 
demonstration that the “market makers” were privy to the truthful information, if, despite the fraudu-
lent attempt to manipulate market price, news of the truthful information entered the market and dissi-
pated the effects of the misstatements or a demonstration that the plaintiffs divested their shares for 
reasons other than the belief that a misrepresentation had occurred. Id. at 248–49. The Court later 
referred to the concept underlying the rebuttable presumption as the well-known “fraud-on-the-
market” theory. Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, 552 U.S. 148, 170–71 (2008). For 
the legal background and an overview of the fraud-on-the-market theory, see Jeffrey L. Oldham, 
Comment, Taking “Efficient Markets” Out of the Fraud-on-the-Market Doctrine After the Private 
Securities Litigation Reform Act, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 995, 1006–15 (2003). 
 149 Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton, Co., 131 S. Ct. 2179, 2185 (2011). 
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5. Loss Causation and Economic Loss 
Loss causation is the second segment of causation that connects the initial 
misrepresentation and inflated price at which the security was purchased to the 
actual economic loss sustained by the plaintiff.150 A plaintiff must show that 
the misrepresentation resulted in subsequent economic loss in the form of a 
decreased share price.151 This requirement prevents securities laws from essen-
tially requiring issuers to insure investors against declines in the value of their 
investments that are unrelated to the alleged fraud.152 
An inflated purchase price alone is not sufficient to cause an economic 
loss.153 For instance, an investor who purchases a security with an inflated 
price based on a material misrepresentation might sell before the misrepresen-
tation comes to light, before a drop in share price occurs, and thus, before an 
economic loss is incurred.154 Additionally, an economic loss might be the result 
of other intervening causes, such as world events, new economic circumstanc-
es, changes in investor expectations, or new industry or company-specific con-
ditions that cause a drop in share price.155 A plaintiff would not be able to 
prove loss causation to the extent that any one of these factors has caused his 
or her economic loss.156 
B. Damages Under Rule 10b-5 
As in common law fraud, damages are an element of a private Rule 10b-5 
action.157 The Exchange Act limits recovery in any private action to “actual” 
damages.158 Actual damages do not include punitive or other extra-
compensatory damages and are usually measured by the plaintiff’s out-of-
pocket loss.159 Additionally, the PSLRA limits damages in private actions to 
the difference between the security’s purchase price and the security’s mean 
                                                                                                                           
 150 See Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 343–44 (2005). 
 151 Id. 
 152 Holbrook, supra note 89, at 223. 
 153 Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 131 S. Ct. at 2186. 
 154 See id. 
 155 Id. 
 156 Id. 
 157 THOMAS LEE HAZEN, 4 TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 12.12(1)(A) 
(2015), available at Westlaw 4 Law Sec. Reg. § 12.12(1)(A). 
 158 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a)(1) (2012); Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 734. 
 159 Holbrook, supra note 89, at 226. The Court has also expressly recognized a measure of dam-
ages based on the defendant’s gain for fraud perpetrated on a closed market. See Affiliated Ute Citi-
zens of Utah v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 155 (1972). This measure is generally based on contract 
law and thus requires that privity exist between the plaintiff and defendant; privity is absent in most 
open-market fraud cases because the company that makes the representation does not sell the stock to 
the plaintiff. Burch, supra note 17, at 365, 368. The defendant’s gain measure also affords a more 
concrete valuation for closed-market damages because there is no market-value benchmark that can be 
used by the court to determine out of pocket loss. See id. at 364–65. 
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trading price during the ninety-day period preceding the date on which the 
misrepresentation was revealed to the market.160 This provision thus caps the 
plaintiff’s total possible recovery.161 
The out-of-pocket damage rule focuses only on what the plaintiff has lost, 
making no allowance for what the plaintiff might have gained had the misrep-
resented information been true or had the defendant performed as promised.162 
It equals the difference between the price at which the plaintiff bought or sold 
the securities and the price at which the plaintiff would have bought or sold 
those securities in the absence of the defendant’s misrepresentation.163 This 
loss calculus fixes the measure of the loss on the date of the purchase or sale 
itself and, per the requirements of the loss causation element, excludes any loss 
that is attributable to any market decline unrelated to the misrepresentation.164 
Accordingly, the “most common method of estimating per-share damages” is 
to use an “event study” to “isolate the effects of the withheld [or misrepresent-
ed] information” on the post-disclosure stock price from factors “unrelated to 
the litigation.”165 
III. APPLICATION OF RULE 10B-5 TO GREENWASH 
The elements of economic loss and loss causation pose obstacles to green 
investors who want to pursue a Rule 10b-5 (the “Rule”) claim for certain green 
misrepresentations.166 Certain other elements of the Rule, however, pose addi-
tional obstacles that are unique to greenwash.167 These are identified to suggest 
that there are other potential limits on the Rule’s availability in the socially 
responsible investment (“SRI”) context, even if the plaintiff suffers an eco-
nomic loss.168 
A. Material Misrepresentation or Omission of Fact 
The social or green character of a misrepresentation is not alone determi-
native of its materiality.169 The U.S. Supreme Court has explicitly rejected such 
categorical rules.170 In Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, the Court noted 
                                                                                                                           
 160 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4e (2012); Holbrook, supra note 89, at 228 n.95. 
 161 Holbrook, supra note 89, at 228 n.95. 
 162 Id. at 228. 
 163 See id. 
 164 Id. at 229. 
 165 Id. at 234 (quoting Janet Cooper Alexander, Rethinking Damages in Securities Class Actions, 
48 STAN. L. REV. 1487, 1491 (1996)). 
 166 See supra notes 150–156, infra notes 204–252 and accompanying text. 
 167 See supra note 18 and accompanying text (discussing materiality). 
 168 See infra note 169–261 and accompanying text. 
 169 See Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, 131 S. Ct. 1309, 1318–19 (2011). 
 170 Id. 
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that the defendant’s argument rested on the flawed premise that statistically 
significant scientific data was the only reliable evidence of causation between a 
drug and an illness.171 It went on to demonstrate that there were other facts that 
indicated that there was indeed a plausible causal link that a reasonable inves-
tor would consider relevant.172 This focus on causation shows what the Court 
considered most important to its materiality inquiry—that which the causal 
link led to: significant liability, subsequent costs, and ultimately, a good eco-
nomic reason for investors to have divested their money had the information 
been disclosed.173 Thus, the Court implicitly drew the line of materiality at the 
point where the information contained indicia that could bear on the economic 
value of the company.174 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit focused on the vagueness 
of the company’s statements in In re Ford Motor Co. Securities Litigation.175 
Noting that the statements were “not capable of objective verification” and “so 
lacking in specificity” that they could not be important, the court demonstrated 
an implicit line of reasoning that is similar to that of the Court in Matrixx Initi-
atives, Inc.176 Such imprecise information is immaterial to a reasonable inves-
tor because it is not specific enough to relate the economic value of the com-
pany.177 
Taken together, Matrixx Initiatives, Inc., and In re Ford Motor Co. Securi-
ties Litigation have at least one implication for green investors: the material 
omission of a particular report with specific information and non-material mis-
leading statements of a generalized nature show that materiality depends, to 
some degree, on the specificity of the information at issue and that misleading 
information alone is not sufficient.178 Therefore, the typical misleading green 
slogans and affirmations that companies make about their reputations and prac-
tices will probably not meet the materiality requirement.179 These might in-
clude, for example, British Petroleum’s television and print advertisements 
professing that it is a “global leader” in clean energy production and Walmart’s 
public relation announcement proclaiming that it is an environmental leader.180 
                                                                                                                           
 171 Id. at 1319. 
 172 Id. at 1323 (noting that if information provided to Matrixx by medical experts revealed a plau-
sible causal relationship between its product and illness, consumers would have probably not used the 
product as a result and the resulting drop in sales would have been relevant to a reasonable investor). 
 173 See id. 
 174 See id. 
 175 See Matrixx Initiatives, Inc., 381 F.3d 563, 570–71 (6th Cir. 2004). 
 176 See 131 S. Ct. at 1323; In re Ford Motor Co. Sec. Litig., 381 F.3d 563, 571 (6th Cir. 2004). 
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That the misrepresentation must contain information that is specific 
enough to implicate a potential change in the company’s economic value 
seems implicit in the Court’s holdings.181 Yet the Court has stated that the poli-
cy of the test is to filter out trivial information.182 Thus, the test’s purpose does 
not seem to contemplate such a narrow reading; only through the Court’s ap-
plication of the materiality test does the focus on information revealing poten-
tial economic costs appear.183 Therefore, this focus might simply be incidental 
to determining materiality in the vast majority of securities fraud cases, which 
inherently involve economic information at their core.184 
Furthermore, statistics show that SRI market participants have invested a 
significant amount of assets in screened accounts, and these investors base 
their investment decisions on non-economic factors.185 It seems untenable to 
exclude all such market participants from the “reasonable investor” designa-
tion because the sheer value of SRI investments evinces that it is a reasonable 
investment strategy.186 Additionally, focusing too closely on the economic 
costs normally associated with typical misrepresentations might overlook the 
possibility that even purely ethical misrepresentations can have long-term eco-
nomic costs that might not manifest in an immediate reduction in stock 
price.187 Thus, a strong argument can be made that a reasonable investor would 
consider information that reveals potential reduction in the value of the com-
pany, whether economic or social, as significantly changing the total mix of 
information made available.188 
                                                                                                                           
walmart-accused-of-greenwashing-over-clean-energy-claims/, archived at http://perma.cc/CAX3-
59FQ; James Ridgeway, BP’s Slick Greenwashing, MOTHER JONES (May 4, 2010, 7:30 AM), http://
www.motherjones.com/mojo/2010/05/bp-coated-sludge-after-years-greenwashing, archived at http://
perma.cc/8GRA-NS98. 
 181 See, e.g., Matrixx Initiatives, Inc., 131 S. Ct. at 1323; In re Ford Motor Co. Sec. Litig., 381 
F.3d at 571. 
 182 See Matrixx Initiatives, Inc., 131 S. Ct. at 1318. 
 183 Id. at 1323; see In re Ford Motor Co. Sec. Litig., 381 F.3d at 571. 
 184 See RICHARDSON, supra note 8, at 21 (“[Although] the market [might] value ethical conduct 
when embodied in regulation or social pressures expressed through the lens of reputational risk, ethics 
has not traditionally been integral to investment decisions.”). 
 185 See THE FORUM FOR SUSTAINABLE & RESPONSIBLE INV., supra note 1, at 11. 
 186 See generally FUNG ET AL., supra note 3, at 8–10 (providing statistics related to SRI growth 
for various nations’ economies). 
 187 PETER CAMEJO, THE SRI ADVANTAGE: WHY SOCIALLY RESPONSIBLE INVESTING HAS OUT-
PERFORMED FINANCIALLY 51 (2002). SRI focuses on the long-term and encourages policies that 
strengthen the economy’s potential. Id. Camejo explains by way of example that although clear-
cutting thousand-year-old redwoods might be profitable in the short-term, the practice could under-
mine the economy over the long-term and eventually be reflected in the financial performance of the 
company. Id. 
 188 See Matrixx Initiatives, Inc., 131 S. Ct. at 1323; CAMEJO, supra note 187, at 51. 
426 Environmental Affairs [Vol. 42:405 
B. Connection with a Purchase or Sale of a Security 
Green investors differ from traditional investors in the way they base their 
purchasing decisions, but not in the manner in which they purchase their secu-
rities.189 They merely screen potential investments according to environmental 
metrics or criteria before making an ordinary purchase.190 Green investors, 
therefore, will typically meet the actual purchaser requirement of the Rule be-
cause they hold contractual rights to their investments.191 
C. Scienter 
Generally, green investors want to avoid companies that adopt hollow en-
vironmental practices—such as making exaggerated claims or intentions—that 
do not create environmentally positive results.192 Such claims, despite their 
misleading nature, might often fall under the Private Securities Litigation Re-
form Act’s (the “PSLRA”) safe harbor provision.193 For example, Walmart re-
cently stated that it intends to produce seven billion kilowatt hours of renewa-
ble energy annually by 2020 in order to decrease its energy consumption by 
twenty percent over that time.194 This claim might not incur liability under the 
Rule even if it was recklessly made and never materializes.195 Walmart would 
have only needed to sufficiently couch the statements in cautionary language 
to have them qualify under the PSLRA’s safe harbor provision.196 
Beyond the safe harbor provision, the PSLRA and case law requires that a 
plaintiff plead facts that, on the whole, give rise to a strong inference that the 
defendant acted recklessly or knowingly.197 As the Court demonstrated in Ma-
trixx Initiatives, Inc., the inference that the defendant acted with intent must be 
at least as compelling as any opposing inference.198 In that case, the Court 
found that this standard was met because the defendant had hired a consultant 
to review the safety of its product, solicited the advice of experts, and then, 
importantly, issued a press release that suggested its studies had confirmed the 
safety of its product when this was not actually the case.199 It thus appears 
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green investors will need to plead facts that demonstrate that the defendant had 
reason to know that its environmental claims were not true and that, taken to-
gether, sufficiently support the inference that the defendant subsequently stood 
by its misrepresentations to protect its interests.200 
D. Reliance 
Green investors who bring suit over a misrepresentation that creates an 
artificial market price will be able to rely on the rebuttable presumption of reli-
ance by showing that the misrepresentation became known to the public, the 
transaction occurred in an open-market, and the relevant purchase took place 
between the time the misrepresentation was made and the time the truth was 
revealed.201 
Apart from the rebuttable presumption, green investors may prove reliance 
the traditional way: by pointing to specific facts that demonstrate a misrepresen-
tation was made and that it formed a basis for their investment decision.202 Mis-
representations of a purely ethical or green nature might often come in the form 
of an overt statement that can be identified by a values-based investor, especially 
when made by a defendant company to gain a reputational benefit.203 
E. Loss Causation and Economic Loss 
Companies view investment as the means to acquire new physical re-
sources, such as facilities and equipment, and new human resources, such as 
skills and training.204 These resources are otherwise known as capital, which 
companies use “to produce goods and services.”205 The company’s cost of cap-
ital is the amount that it has to pay to make itself attractive to investors—paid 
in the form of the investor’s return.206 A low cost of capital allows a company 
to undertake additional profitable projects.207 Furthermore, cost of capital is 
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generally assumed to have an inverse relationship with stock price.208 A higher 
stock price confers additional benefits upon a company.209 
By choosing not to invest in certain unethical companies, green investors 
aim to lower the demand for the company’s stock, which lowers the market 
price of its shares and raises its cost of capital.210 Investors hope to influence 
corporate behavior by rewarding ethical companies with capital and punishing 
unethical companies with the loss of capital.211 A green investor is similarly 
motivated to divest from a company that misrepresents a green practice.212 
Thus, the premise of SRI suggests that the economic loss element of a Rule 
10b-5 action will always be satisfied following a misrepresentation because the 
green investor’s divestment will reduce the market price of the stock even if 
the corrected information does not reduce the expected future earnings of the 
company.213 
This presumption, however, runs counter to the basic principles of fi-
nance.214 The demand for a stock is generally represented by a downward slop-
ing curve along each unit of quantity demanded for a particular price.215 A 
share of stock’s value to any particular owner “is equal to the total present val-
ue of its future after-tax profits.”216 The equilibrium price of a stock is its actu-
al value at any given time and is determined almost instantaneously by the 
market of buyers and sellers, each of whom drive the price to that point ac-
cording to their unique profit forecasts.217 It can be found at the point where 
the demand curve intersects with the vertical supply curve.218 Therefore, when 
the market finds out that a company previously misrepresented information, 
and that information, once revealed, bears negatively on the expected earnings 
of the company, the demand curve shifts leftward and the equilibrium price 
falls.219 
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The same is not true for a sale of stock in the absence of new information 
(i.e., when the corrected information does not reduce expected earnings).220 
Under conventional finance theory, the sole act of divestiture or trade of any 
quantity of a company’s shares does not affect its price.221 This is because all 
relevant information is already available and known to the market and there 
exists many perfect substitutes in the form of other outstanding common stock 
shares in the same company.222 The theory thus holds that at any given time, 
the stock price accounts for all information available.223 For example, suppose 
a car enthusiast wants to sell and liquidate his or her stock in a company to buy 
a new car; this desire to sell is unique and is in no way motivated by, nor does 
it implicate, the potential earnings of the company.224 Moreover, this sale is not 
like the sale of a one-of-a-kind painting.225 The price of such an item would be 
set by the unique interests of the purchaser and seller because there would be 
no available substitutes, whereas the price of the car enthusiast’s share of stock 
would be set by the vast market of buyers and sellers who would value it and 
every other share of the company’s stock the same way: according to the com-
pany’s expected future cash flows.226 
The downward sloping and horizontal demand curve models offer two 
conclusions, respectively.227 First, if a misrepresentation contains new, unex-
pected information that both offends the green investor’s ethics and bears on 
the company’s potential earnings, then the demand for the company’s stock 
will decrease because all investors would consider the extra risk in subsequent 
purchases and sales.228 The decrease in demand causes a new, lower equilibri-
um price that implies an economic loss and therefore should make a Rule 10b-
5 action available.229 Second, if a misrepresentation only contains information 
that offends the green investor’s ethics, and does not affect the expected future 
cash flows of the company, then neither it nor the subsequent divestment will 
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decrease the demand of the stock.230 The ethical leanings of green investors 
are, practically speaking, the equivalent to the car enthusiast’s desire to sell 
and liquidate his or her stock in a company to buy a new car—it is an individ-
ualized and specific choice, which neither reflects nor implicates the potential 
earnings of the company.231 That some buyers will exit the market does not 
shift the demand curve because the rest of the market does not view the new 
information to be relevant.232 The market as a whole values the stock at the 
same price as before the misrepresentation.233 The only effect of the divest-
ment is that green investors own less of the company and traditional investors 
own more.234 The company still “raises the same amount of capital, its asset 
prices are unchanged[,] and its cost of capital is the same.”235 Moreover, a 
remedy under the Rule is not available because the green investor does not 
incur an economic loss.236 
The existence of a horizontal demand curve for divestment, however, is 
based on models of perfect market efficiency that might not hold true under all 
circumstances.237 Empirical evidence suggests that a downward sloping de-
mand curve could exist when the sale of a stock takes place, even in the ab-
sence of new information.238 A sale might affect demand when investors be-
lieve that the stock has few substitutes, such as stock in specialized boutique 
companies or when a sale takes place in a small and restricted market.239 Large 
block sales of stock by socially responsible investors (“SRI investors”) might 
also lower demand by causing other investors to assume that new earnings in-
formation has been released.240 At least one study has shown that a drop in 
price might result from a boycott by ethical investors, albeit a very small 
one.241 As econometric analysis can isolate a discrete drop in share price fol-
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lowing a misrepresentation, even a relatively small drop that is sustained with-
in the PSLRA’s ninety-day market-loss window should be enough for a green 
investor to allege an economic loss.242 
Although these empirical studies of stock sales are cause for questioning 
the extent to which the perfect market assumptions of finance theory hold true 
in the real world, they have nonetheless failed to account for the effects of SRI 
divestment on stock prices in several prominent case studies.243 The companies 
that supported Apartheid and continued to do business in South Africa follow-
ing divestment by SRI investors did not suffer adverse stock price move-
ments.244 Additionally, the significant divestment from tobacco companies by 
large investors did not impact their stock prices and the exclusion from SRI 
funds did not cause a decrease in the value of other objectionable stocks, such 
as alcohol and weapons manufacturers.245 
Thus, apart from the possible circumstances when market imperfections 
might exist, the sum of evidence indicates that it is highly unlikely that a green 
investor would succeed in bringing a Rule 10b-5 action.246 Green investors 
will not be able to allege economic loss when the corrected information reveals 
an unethical, but otherwise legal, practice that does not bear on the company’s 
earnings because divestment alone generally does not reduce demand or the 
stock’s equilibrium price.247 
Beyond the potential economic loss to the green investor, there might be 
multiple parties who suffer to some extent from a purely ethical green misrep-
resentation.248 The green investors themselves might suffer psychic injury from 
having been duped into supporting practices that are antithetical to their val-
ues.249 Furthermore, natural resources existing in public trust might be indi-
rectly damaged by the misappropriation of the green investor’s financial sup-
port and protection, assuming they would have otherwise put their money to 
some effective use.250 On an even more abstract level, such misrepresentations 
could undermine the legitimacy of the SRI movement, which, if it continues to 
grow and becomes the mainstream approach, could potentially be very effec-
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tive at influencing company behavior and thus producing real-world environ-
mental benefits.251 The Rule is a securities fraud device, however, and its focus 
is on market value; to the extent that these harms do not cause a decline in an 
investment’s market value, they will not incur liability under the Rule.252 
F. Damages 
A green misrepresentation that causes a drop in share price will permit a 
green investor plaintiff to identify and isolate an economic loss, demonstrate 
loss causation, and recover the difference between the artificially inflated price 
and its inherent value on the date of purchase.253 
Assuming typical open primary and secondary market conditions, the out-
of-pocket loss rule,254 however, is of questionable efficacy, both in terms of 
compensation to green investor victims and deterrence of misrepresenting 
companies.255 A Rule 10b-5 action is typically brought by a class of current 
and former shareholders who purchased the stock during the relevant class pe-
riod as a result of the company’s representational misconduct.256 If the class of 
plaintiffs wins a judgment or reaches a settlement, then the current sharehold-
ers of the defendant pay those costs.257 Accordingly, securities class actions on 
the open market simply transfer money between current shareholders and for-
mer shareholders.258 Therefore, even when the economic loss element is satis-
fied and the Rule permits green investors to bring suit and recover out-of-
pocket damages, they might in fact recover nothing at all—instead finding that 
they are merely paying their lawyers to pay themselves.259 If they are not cur-
rent shareholders, then they will only recover from current, often innocent, 
shareholders.260 Meanwhile, the corporate managers who made the misrepre-
sentations might go largely unpunished and the lawyers who litigated the case 
will take up to thirty percent of the award.261 
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IV. AN ADMINISTRATIVE ALTERNATIVE TO ADDRESS GREENWASH 
Misrepresentations in the socially responsible investment (“SRI”) uni-
verse often cause unique harms that can be difficult to value according to an 
economic formula.262 The purpose of the private right of action under Rule 
10b-5 (the “Rule”) is to provide a remedy for securities fraud that has tradi-
tionally led to economic loss.263 It is no wonder then that economic loss forms 
the crux of liability under the Rule and limits its effectiveness in the SRI con-
text.264 Preventative regulatory measures should still exist, however, because 
greenwashing can cause green investors to invest in and support practices they 
find unethical.265 Further, such misrepresentations cause green investors to in-
cur an opportunity cost in the form of a missed opportunity to invest in com-
panies that support true green practices over the investment period.266 The op-
timal remedy for green misrepresentations would focus on the deterrence of 
wrongdoers because this indirectly protects the unique intangible values of 
green investors.267 Ultimately, green investors want the assurance that their 
investment will yield the social benefit professed by the company rather than 
the assurance that their money will be returned to them if it is not.268 
A. The SEC Should Develop a Uniform Environmental  
Performance Ratings System 
The first step in creating such a remedy is that the Securities and Ex-
change Commission (SEC) should adopt standards for environmental ratings 
organizations like KLD Research and Analytics, Domini Social Investments, 
and Calvert Investments,269 which guide their methodologies to focus on in-
formation that reflects real-world environmental results and not merely green 
communications or processes.270 Like mutual fund screens, a number of com-
panies have developed green indices that use one of fifty or more unique rat-
ings methodologies.271 These funds and indices’ ratings methodologies must 
inevitably prioritize some criteria over others—for example, giving more 
weight to practices that address climate change than to practices that address 
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rainforest loss or water usage.272 The lack of uniformity and transparency 
among these rating methodologies reduce their reliability and effectiveness.273 
Moreover, studies have shown that many of these methodologies assign high 
ratings to greenwash and often yield SRI portfolios that are practically indis-
tinguishable from conventional ones.274 
Although it might be useful and even necessary for funds and indices to 
use a variety of methodologies, one prominent scholar has argued that it would 
nevertheless be more effective if such methodologies focused on fewer criteria 
that yielded actual environmental results.275 A more uniform system in this 
sense would give notice to corporate managers about which of their company’s 
practices will be shown to green investors in the form of ratings and would 
thereby allow them to make a better cost-benefit analysis of which green prac-
tices are worth adopting.276 It would also increase the legitimacy of the green 
investment movement by making it more likely that green investments actually 
protect the environment.277 
B. Green Investor Guides and Civil Fines 
The second step is that the SEC should adopt guidelines for corporate 
managers similar to the Guides for the Use of Environmental Marketing 
Claims that the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has issued to advertisers.278 
Such guides would give notice to corporate managers of which communica-
tions the SEC deems greenwash.279 The SEC should also supplement them 
with warnings for first-time or non-material violations and civil fines for repeat 
or egregious violations.280 
The economic analysis of tort law posits that the optimization of deter-
rence can be achieved by giving an incentive to potential wrongdoers—in the 
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pra note 17, at 382–83 (discussing the role of a penalty in achieving deterrence); Feinstein, supra note 
11, at 244–45 (noting that the FTC used the Green Guides as a basis for bringing enforcement actions 
against marketers). 
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form of avoiding a penalty—to “take the appropriate amount of care” and thus 
internalize the costs of their actions.281 Accordingly, predictable and accurate 
damages are necessary conditions: potential wrongdoers will internalize the 
costs of their actions only if they consider it the cheapest option.282 The opti-
mization of deterrence generally focuses on making the wrongdoer internalize 
the harm dealt to the victim because setting a penalty according to the wrong-
doer’s gain can impose unwanted costs on society through over deterrence.283 
When the victim’s loss cannot be measured accurately, however, setting a pen-
alty according to the measure of the wrongdoer’s gain is appropriate.284 
In the case of purely ethical green misrepresentations, the calculation of 
an optimal monetary penalty might prove impossible because both the inves-
tor’s loss and the company’s gain might be too intangible and speculative to 
measure.285 But unlike the losses, which need to be accurately measured in 
order to be compensated and internalized by the company, the company’s gain 
need not be accurately measured to be taken away.286 
The real driver of a purely green misrepresentation is the intangible repu-
tation and goodwill benefits of being perceived a green company.287 To take 
                                                                                                                           
 281 Holbrook, supra note 89, at 237; see Keith N. Hylton, Punitive Damages and the Economic 
Theory of Penalties, 87 GEO. L.J. 421, 421 (1998). 
Generally, complete deterrence is accomplished by eliminating the prospect of gain on 
the part of the offender. The alternative . . . is . . . optimal deterrence, . . . which implies 
deterring offensive conduct only up to the point at which society begins to lose more 
from deterrence efforts than from the offenses it deters. 
Hylton, supra, at 421. 
 282 Holbrook, supra note 89, at 237. 
 283 Hylton, supra note 281, at 424. For example: if X causes a harm of $100, and expects a penal-
ty of $50, then X would not spend more than $50 to avoid causing the harm. Id. Hylton notes that a 
penalty “that is larger than the harm divided by the probability of liability [of being caught] would 
result in overdeterrence costs because potential offenders would invest too much, from society’s 
viewpoint, in efforts to avoid causing harm.” Id. 
 284 Id. at 432. The victim’s loss measure is generally considered the superior penalty calculus 
because it cannot result in over deterrence costs to society regardless of whether gains or losses are 
greater. Id. at 424, 430. When the defendant’s gain is less than the costs imposed on the victim, how-
ever, then it cannot result in over deterrence costs either, and arguably proves the appropriate measure 
when additional factors are at play. See id. at 430–33. Among these factors is when there are infor-
mation costs, that is, it is known that gains are less than social losses but the gains are easier to meas-
ure. Id. at 432–33. 
 285 See FUNG ET AL., supra note 3, at 3, 44–46 (noting the intangible nature of green investor’s 
interest); RICHARDSON, supra note 8, at 166–68 (noting that investment can lower cost of capital for 
small specialized companies); Burch, supra note 17, at 369 (noting that part of the company’s gain is 
intangible). 
 286 See Burch, supra note 17, at 369 (discussing the intangible benefits of a misrepresentation). 
 287 See Flammer, supra note 8, at 760 (explaining a survey that “[seventy-two percent] of the 
CEOs cited ‘brand, trust, and reputation’ . . . as one of the main factors driving them to take action on 
sustainability issues”); Richardson & Cragg, supra note 12, at 28 (noting that reputation constitutes 
between fifty and seventy percent of many large companies’ value); see also FUNG ET AL., supra note 
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away those benefits, the SEC need only mandate that environmental perfor-
mance rating organizations designate its civil fines as a significant discounting 
factor within their ratings calculus.288 The civil fine, even if for a nominal val-
ue, could thus have the practical effect of banishing the violating company, for 
a time, from the SRI universe, thereby stripping it of its intangible reputational 
benefit and barring it from misappropriating the funds of future green inves-
tors.289 In this way, the green investment guides, civil fines, and uniform 
standard of environmental performance ratings could prove an effective system 
of specific and general deterrence without the need to monetize the social val-
ues that are at the heart of SRI.290 
The system could offer a cut-and-dried standard that allows corporate 
managers to predict the risks of greenwashing while providing them with an 
incentive to internalize their costs.291 Although there is a potential downside to 
a strictly administrative enforcement mechanism—such as the risk of inade-
quate deterrence from constraints on the SEC’s budget, bureaucratic inefficien-
cy, and regulatory capture—such risks should be considered in light of the po-
tential for net cost reduction.292 For example, it would not impose the substan-
tial costs of mandatory disclosure293 and would circumvent many of the inher-
ent flaws of a Rule 10b-5 action among private litigants, including the costs to 
companies from vexatious litigation, the costs to non-culpable investors from 
paying attorneys to transfer their wealth, and the inherent limitation on recov-
ery that economic loss poses in many cases.294 
CONCLUSION 
 The SEC and private litigants have traditionally used Rule 10b-5 to com-
bat a wide range of securities fraud. The availability of Rule 10b-5 to private 
                                                                                                                           
3, at 75 (explaining that companies gain a competitive advantage through the reputational benefit of 
being perceived as environmentally responsible). 
 288 See Delmas et al., supra note 9, at 255–56, 263. 
 289 See FUNG ET AL., supra note 3, at 75; Delmas et al., supra note 9, at 255–56, 263. 
 290 See Holbrook, supra note 89, at 237–39 (discussing optimal deterrence). Imposing both warn-
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 291 See Holbrook, supra note 89, at 237–39. 
 292 See Rose, supra note 99, at 1340–41. 
 293 See Anita Indira Anand, An Analysis of Enabling vs. Mandatory Corporate Governance: 
Structures Post-Sarbanes-Oxley, 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 229, 242–46 (2006) (describing the costs associ-
ated with mandatory versus voluntary corporate governance disclosures). 
 294 See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71, 81 (2006) (noting costs 
of vexatious litigation); Burch, supra note 17, at 374–75 (discussing transaction costs and wealth 
transference); see, e.g., Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton, Co., 131 S. Ct. 2179, 2186 (2011) 
(discussing the economic loss and loss causation requirements of Rule 10b-5). 
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litigants in the SRI context—and specifically the green investment context—
however, is limited due to the economic focus of 10b-5 liability. Green inves-
tors might invest their money based on a company’s misrepresentation but will 
not be able to bring suit if their investment did not suffer an economic loss 
from a drop in share price. As a result, significant intangible costs can go un-
compensated, including the green investor’s psychic harm for having been 
duped into complicity with an act he or she feels is unethical, the harm to the 
legitimacy of the green investment movement—including the loss of future 
green investments, the harm to actual green companies who missed out on the 
investment due to the wrongdoer’s misrepresentation, and the harm to the envi-
ronment that results from less financial protection. 
These harms can be redressed by a better system of deterrence of wrong-
doers. Such a system could be implemented by the SEC to include a transpar-
ent and uniform environmental performance ratings standard that focuses on 
green outcomes rather than processes, green investor guides that instruct cor-
porate managers on what is deemed greenwash, and civil fines that penalize 
wrongdoers and thereby incentivize their compliance with the guides by taking 
away their gains if they do not. Ultimately, this system would strengthen the 
green investment movement and help it better achieve actual positive envi-
ronmental results for society and the planet. 
  
 
